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The Republic of Ireland is one of four Member States in the European
Community where the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of
electricity is carried out almost entirely by a state-owned, vertically-inte-
grated monopoly.' The Electricity Supply Board (ESB) was established for
the most part in 1927,2 which makes it the oldest member of this breed of
state-owned enterprise in the European Community.
This article discusses and analyzes the impact of European Community
legislation 3 on the electricity supply industry of the Republic of Ireland. It
is divided into several parts. Part I discusses the historical background and
structure of Ireland's dominant supplier, the ESB, and analyzes the recent
announcements for a restructuring of this body. Part II discusses and ana-
lyzes the regulation of electricity generation, transmission, distribution and
supply in Ireland, including the Community directives on price trans-
parency and transit. Part III focuses on relevant legal changes resulting
from the Irish implementation of Community directives on the environ-
ment, products liability, and public procurement. The latter part includes a
description of the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S.
and the European Community on government procurement as it relates to
the electricity sector.
While the general features of the European Commission's program for
an internal market in electricity may be familiar to many international
energy lawyers,4 the scope and impact of this program on particular
* B.A., J.D., M.Fn., LL.M., Research Fellow, International Institute of Energy Law, University
of Leiden, The Netherlands.
1. The other EC Member States that have this general type of electricity supply industry are
France, Greece, and Italy. Portugal had a similar system following the nationalizations of 1975; but,
Electricidade de Portugal (E.P.) is currently undergoing restructuring, as well as substantial foreign
investment in new Portuguese generation facilities. See 1993 O.J. (L 265) 3.
2. Electricity Act, No. 27 (1927).
3. Under Article 189 of the Treaty ESTABuSMNo THE EuROPEAN EcoNoNuc COMMUNrrY
[EEC TREATY] binding Community legislation can take the form of regulations, directives, or decisions.
4. In 1988, the European Commission issued a Working Document on the Internal Energy
Market. COM(88)238 final. In 1992, the Commission elaborated upon and supplemented the original
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national regulatory regimes is not as well-known. By focusing on the
changes in Irish laws relating to the electricity sector, this article serves as a
case study of the effectiveness of the legal transformations being sought by
the European Community in this field. In addition, this article aims to pro-
vide a thorough description of the structure and regulation of the Irish
electricity system, since no other source of current written information
seems to be available.
I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ELECrRICITY SUPPLY BOARD
A. The 1927 Act
When the Irish State was founded in 1922, the electricity industry was
fragmented among numerous municipal and private undertakings, some
authorized by statute, but most non-authorized. The parliamentary
debates regarding the Electricity Supply Bill of 1927 reveal that members
of the Ddil Eireann engaged in a review of electricity law developments in
the United States, Canada, and other parts of Europe.5 Of particular inter-
est to the Irish government officials was the development of the "super-
power" concept in the United States. This was understood as the
development of profitable, high-volume electricity supply in populated
areas where "cream-skimming" could take place.6 Because the electrifica-
tion of the less-populated areas of Ireland was a goal of the Irish govern-
ment, this type of free-market development was unattractive.
Although the Irish government rejected the option of continued pri-
vate ownership and development in Ireland,7 it also recognized that an
electricity system under comprehensive state ownership was more likely to
perform better when guided by independent business management. Thus,
a compromise of sorts was reached. The Ddil Eireann contemplated a cen-
tral authority "independent of Parliament and Government as far as that
could reasonably be arranged,"' backed by the financial resources of the
state,9 free from the control of the civil service,1" and "armed with the ful-
program with new proposals for completing the internal market in electricity. COM(91)548 final. These
proposed directives have encountered opposition and have been withdrawn for purposes of
modification. There are a number of useful secondary sources describing the EC's Internal Energy
Market program as it relates to electricity. See, e.g., LEIGH HANCHER, EC ELEcTRicrry LAW 5-17
(1992); EDISON ELEcIRsc INSTrTUTE, ELEicRICTY IN A UNIFIED EUROPE: AN INTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE 'EC 1992' PROGRAM 5-23 (1992); See also R. Whish, European Commission Policies and Technical
Change: Competitive Impact and Regulatory Prospects, 80 REGULATORY POLICY & THE ENERGY
SEcroR, Proceedings of a CRI Seminar of Nov. 11, 1992 (1993).
5. 18 DAIL DEB. col. 1898-02 (Mar. 15, 1927).
6. See id at 1899. For a more detailed explanation of the "superpower" concept, see W.
MURRAY, SUPERPOWER: ITS GENESIS AND FUTURE (1925).
7. It was believed that concessions to private parties, particularly foreign parties, would be
difficult to audit and might conflict with the government's program of industrial development. See 18
DAIL DEB. col. 1905-06 (Mar. 15, 1927).
8. Id. at 1909.
9. Id. at 1902, 1909.
10. Id. at 1903.
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lest possible powers"" to manage the completion and operation of the
hydroelectric generation project on the Shannon River and to acquire all of
the other authorized or non-authorized undertakings. It was clearly
intended that this central authority was to be given every power necessary
to become, in its discretion, the sole supplier of electricity in the country.12
This conception of the ESB was the defining moment for the electric-
ity supply industry in Ireland. The 1927 Electricity Act established the gen-
eral duty of the ESB to generate, transmit, distribute, supply, and promote
the use of the electricity produced by the hydroelectric power produced on
the Shannon River and other lands acquired by the government for such
purpose.13 By exercising its powers under the 1927 Act to acquire pre-
existing undertakings and consolidate the industry, the ESB enlarged its
corporate purpose and ensured that electricity planning would be under-
taken throughout the country by a single entity.' 4
B. Other Irish Electricity Laws
Although the 1927 Act is the "principle act" in the field, it has been
amended and supplemented to further delineate the powers and duties of
the ESB. One major piece of supplemental legislation is the Electricity
(Supply) (Amendment) Act of 1945,15 which granted the ESB, inter alia,
exclusive rights to the import and export of electricity16 and which
amended the notice requirements to landowners prior to the placing of
electric lines. 17
There were several amendments to the 1927 Act during the 1980s.
The Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act of 198518 was an emergency
measure adopted in response to a declaration of unconstitutionality by the
Irish Supreme Court19 with respect to the above-mentioned notice require-
11. Id at 1920.
12. Id at 1918. The drafters of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1927 did not declare outright that the
Electricity Supply Board (ESB) was to be the sole and exclusive electricity supplier. Electricity Act, No.
27 (1927). They recognized "authorized undertakers" that had been previously granted exclusive rights
to generate, distribute or supply electricity in specified areas. Id §§ 1, 20, 35. The ESB, however, was
granted substantial powers to acquire, take control of, and alter the supply areas of such authorized
undertakings. Id §§ 39,40, 42. In addition, new entrants were prohibited absent the ESB's permission.
Id § 35. The ESB moved quickly to consolidate its power under the 1927 Act and establish its virtual
monopoly over all sectors of the electricity supply industry.
13. Electricity Act, No. 27, §§ 2, 19(a), (c) (1927). The 1927 Act also placed the following duties
on the ESB: 1) "to control, manage, and maintain in good repair and condition and proper and efficient
working order each and every part of the Shannon works ..."; 2) "to control, co-ordinate, and
improve the supply, distribution, and sale of electricity generally in [Ireland]"; and 3) "generally to
perform and exercise all duties and powers which are imposed or conferred on the Board by this Act
and all such other duties and powers as may hereafter be imposed or conferred on the Board by the
Oireachtas." Id. § 19(b), (d), (f).
14. J. RocHE, PL riNo iN im ESB 1 (1978).
15. Electricity Act, No. 12 (1945).
16. Id § 32.
17. Id. § 46.
18. Electricity Act, No. 6 (1985).
19. Electricity Supply Board v. Gormley, 129 I.R 144 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see
infra, note 67 and accompanying text.
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ments to landowners. This Supreme Court decision and the amendment
concern the power and duties of the ESB in connection with the placement
of transmission lines on private property.
Two other acts that amended the 1927 Act were adopted in 1982 and
1988. These amendments relate, inter alia, to the ability of the ESB to
engage in new business activity.2'
C. The ESB's Relationship to the Government
The ESB is considered to be a commercial "state-sponsored body"
under Irish law.21 This term "denotes an authority which discharges spe-
cialized, central functions usually of a governmental nature, yet which is set
at a distance from the Government and Ministers."'  A state-sponsored
body has a separate and continuous legal existence, and is endowed with
the capacity to own property, make contracts, employ persons, and to sue
and be sued.' There is no general statutory definition of a state-sponsored
body in Irish law. There are approximately seventy such bodies in Ireland,
and they account for about ten percent of the gross national product and
about seven percent of the total work force.24
As a state-sponsored body, the ESB is a conduit of governmental sub-
sidies. The fuel purchasing policy of the ESB is the means for shoring up
other parts of the state-owned energy industry?25 For example, the ESB
pays the state gas company, Bord Gais Eireann, substantially more than
the latter pays for gas from Marathon Petroleum's Kinsale gas field off the
southwest coast of Ireland. 6 The ESB also pays high prices for peat from
the state peat company, Bord na Mona. The 1990 average cost for peat was
twice as much as gas (£34.42 per MWh versus £17.12 per Mwh) and nearly
20. The Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act of 1982 permits the ESB to engage in aquaculture.
No. 22 (1982). The Electricity (Supply) (Amendment) Act of 1988 expands the powers of the ESB to
establish new companies, lend money, and guarantee debt, subject to governmental consent. No. 17 § 2
(1988). The Act also expands the power to distribute and sell coal, coal-based products, electricity by-
products and other products. Id §§ 3, 4, 5. The ESB interprets its current mission in a twofold way: 1)
to provide consumers with quality energy services at competitive prices with due care for the natural
environment, and 2) to support national economic progress by engaging in profitable ancillary
activities. ESB, 1991 ANN. REP. inside front cover (1992).
21. The ESB's legal form has been given a surprising number of other names, including: semi-state
body, statutory undertaker, state authority, state organization, state enterprise, public enterprise, and
public corporation. See, e.g., DAVID G. MORGAN & GERARD HoGAN, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW IN
IRELAND, 103 n.1 (2d ed. 1991); see also B. CHUBB, THE GOVERNMENT AND PoLITIcs OF IRELAND, 271
(2d ed. 1982). The legal form has also been equated with the French concept of 4tablissement public
national de caractdre industriel et commercial, which is the legal form for Electricitd de France. See C.
Stevenson, Public Development and the Irish Planning System, 8 URBAN LAW AND POLICY 33, 41
(1986).
22. MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note 21, at 104.
23. Id. at 124. Section 27 of the 1927 Act provides that the ESB "shall be a body corporate having
perpetual succession and may sue and be sued under its said style and name." It is not an ordinary
statutory company which would be registered under the Companies Act, 1963.
24. Id. at 103 (citing 1991 statistics from the Dept. of Finance).
25. A. HoLMEs, ELECrRICrrY iN EUROPE 99 (1988). See also MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note 21,
at 121-22 (noting that imports of gas and peat might be cheaper).
26. HoLMEs, supra note 25, at 99.
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three times as expensive as coal (L12.17 per Mwh).27 And following a pol-
icy dating from the 1930s, the ESB takes almost fifty percent of Bord na
Mona's output and burns it in peat-fired stations- that generate nearly 500
MW of electricity. 8
In the case of other European countries where there is a state-owned
monopoly over electricity, the governmental responsibilities for oversight
of the Irish electricity industry are divided among a number of ministries.
The most important of these ministries is the Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications.29 Other ministries, such as the Minister of
Finance, the Minister for the Environment, the Minister for Agriculture,
and the Minister of Labour, also have a role in overseeing of the ESB.
Acting through its ministries, the government is the ultimate authority
regarding national policy on the supply of electricity.3°
The government has the power to appoint the members of the board
of the ESB, and to remove them.31 In 1977, the government adopted legis-
lation to provide for the election of worker-directors to the boards of the
seven largest commercial state-sponsored bodies, including the ESB.32 The
Minister of Labour issued an order providing that the ESB have twelve
directors/members, four of whom represent the work force.33 The govern-
ment's power to dismiss the ESB's board in its entirety remains an impor-
tant means of control over ESB action. In 1987, for example, the (Fianna
Fiil) Government threatened publicly to remove the board unless the ESB
paid rates which the ESB was disputing to local authorities before the Cir-
cuit Court.34 The ESB ultimately conceded. The ESB's obligation to pay
27. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY BOARD, 1990 ANN. REP. 8 (1991). The 1991 Annual Report does not
expressly disclose this type of information for 1991.
28. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 99. According to the ESB, peat accounts for about 14% of the fuel
used in Ireland's electricity generation. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 20, at 1. This means that the
subsidization of Irish peat is within the European Commission's policy that no more than 20% of a
Member State's electricity production can be derived from subsidized indigenous fuels. The cumulative
effect of peat subsidies and subsidies to other indigenous fuels in Ireland may lead to a breach of the
Commission's policy, although the rigidness of this policy has to be questioned. See generally L.
Hancher, State Aid for German Lignite Power Station, 3 UTIL. L. R. 118-19 (1992).
29. Under the 1927 and 1945 Acts, the relevant ministerial post was the Minister for Industry and
Commerce. The post was renamed to the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Energy in the 1970s. It
subsequently changed to Minister of Energy in early 1993.
30. It should be noted, however, that the ESB also has a formal statutory role in the formulation
of national policy; it has been appointed as an advisor to the government on the use of resources for the
generation of electricity, the location of the transmission system, and other matters. Electricity Act, No.
27 (1927).
31. Id §§ 2(4), 5.
32. Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act, 1977.
33. Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Order, S.I. No. 186, item 6 (1978).
34. See MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note 21, at 129 n.98. Governmental control over the ESB was
described by another commentator in 1988 as an "unpredictable but ferocious grip," and the
relationship between the two was described as "all but... war." See HOLMES, supra note 25, at 99. The
same commentator also stated that "[tihe formal rules on government/ESB relations are of little
relevance in the present climate." Id.
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rates to local authorities was thereafter clarified in the 1988 Electricity
(Supply) (Amendment) Act.3 5
The government has the power to approve the form of the ESB's
accounts and to have such accounts audited by a government-appointed
auditor in accordance with the government's regulations as to the time,
place, and method of audits.36 The government can also order repayment
of outstanding debt from the ESB to the government at any time. This
latter power was demonstrated in 1988 when the Minister of Finance per-
suaded the ESB to repay £31.4 million in outstanding debt instead of the
ESB's planned interest payment of £2 million.37
D. The Recent Restructuring Proposals
In 1992, the Minister for Energy initiated a review of the structure of
the ESB with an eye toward restructuring and re-regulating the industry.
Early announcements suggested that the ESB might be divided into two
divisions, one for electricity generation and the other for distribution.3 1
The government was also said to be encouraging private investment in new
power plants to be located in Ireland, which would receive equal access to
the distribution network. However, it was emphasized by the Minister of
Energy that a privatization of existing ESB assets was not planned.39
These plans for restructuring were hindered by a change in govern-
ment in late 1992.40 In May 1993 the process was formally restarted with
the announcement of a more detailed set of government-approved propos-
als. In a press release dated May 21, 1993, the Minister of Transport,
Energy and Communications welcomed the proposals for a major restruc-
turing of the ESB:
This will be the first major change to the structure of the ESB since the Board
was established in 1927 and represents a significant new departure for the
company. The objective is to introduce greater cost transparency and compe-
tition into the electricity sector, which is expected to contribute to the effi-
cient and cost effective running of the electricity service.
41
The details of the restructuring are still being fleshed out, but a basic out-
line has been announced:
35. Electricity Act, No. 17, § 9 (1988).
36. Electricity Act, No. 27, § 7 (1927).
37. MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note 21, at 136.
38. See Ireland Seeks An Internal Energy Market With Allowances For Market Development, 44
EC ENERGY MONTHLY 4 (Aug. 1992).
39. Id. The possible privatization of the ESB has been rumored occasionally in recent years. See,
e.g., Talbert Bid Starts ESB Sale Rumours, 105 POWER iN EUROPE 7 (Aug. 15,1991). One guesstimate of
the proceeds of a sale of the ESB (in late 1990) was £500 million. See MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note
21, at 151 n.78. The ESB issued a statement regarding the proposals for restructuring and/or
privatization in its 1991 Annual Report. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 20, at 24.
40. The Fianna FAil Government was defeated in November 1992, and a new coalition
government was formed. According to one report, one of the conditions for the formation of the new
government was that any privatization plans for the ESB be dropped. See 140 POWER IN EUROPE 18
(Jan. 15, 1993).
41. Press Release, Republic of Ireland, May 21, 1993, Government Information Services, on
behalf of the Department of Transport, Energy, and Communications.
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ESB will remain as a single company and the restructuring will involve the
setting up of business units covering Power Generation, National Grid, Cus-
tomer Service, Commercial Enterprises and Business Services. The business
units will be guided by a small corporate centre, headed by the Chief Execu-
tive, and will be managed on transparent and commercial principles. The pro-
posals provide for the establishment of an independent power procurement
function within ESB. The new arrangements will be subject to independent
public regulation.
The restructuring will ensure that the electricity industry in Ireland complies
fully with the EC requirements for an Open Energy Market. Cost trans-
parency between the different elements of the business will be achieved and
the new structure will facilitate competition, particularly in the generation of
electricity.42
Other regulatory changes have been under discussion but were not
announced formally in May 1993. These include the possibility of setting
up an Office of Electricity Regulation akin to the regulatory body,
OFFER, in Great Britain. This regulatory body might be granted some
authority to regulate the fuels used in the generation process, although
developing criteria for such decisions would be difficult. The possibility of
promoting independent power production at a later stage in the ESB
restructuring has also been discussed. As of July 1993, it was not known
whether legislative changes would be achieved by piecemeal amendments
to the existing legislation or by a new electricity act. One likely statutory
amendment is the removal of the ESB's break-even obligation under the
1927 Act.43
E. Assessment of the Restructuring Proposals in Light of the European
Commission's Program for an Internal Energy Market
In February 1992, the European Commission issued proposed direc-
tives for the completion of the internal market in electricity and gas. The
Commission advocated a three-stage approach. The first stage was charac-
terized as the implementation of the existing directives on price trans-
parency" and transit.45 The second stage was to be based on three "new
agents for change": 1) the abolition of special and exclusive rights, includ-
ing legal monopolies for imports/exports and production, as well as exclu-
sive rights to construct transmission and distribution lines; 2) the
administrative separation of production, transmission, distribution and sup-
ply, which is known as "unbundling"; and 3) third-party access to the trans-
mission/distribution grids. The third stage was to have been based on
progress made in the second stage. The proposed directives for the com-
pletion of the internal market in electricity and gas were scheduled to come
into effect on January 1, 1993. However, they engendered much resistance
42. Communication of the Department of Transport, Energy and Communications to the ESB
Board of Directors, May 21, 1993 (on file at the International Institute of Energy Law, University of
Leiden, The Netherlands).
43. See infra note 74.
44. Council Directive 901337, 1985 O.J. (L 185) 1. For a discussion of this directive, see infra notes
77-80 and accompanying text.
45. Council Directive 90/547, 1990 OJ. (L 313) 33.
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and had to be withdrawn. New proposals are being formulated, but consid-
erable delays in the program are expected.
The proposed restructuring of the ESB announced by the Irish govern-
ment has not been compelled by the European Commission, but it does
appear to fulfill several of the objectives being sought by the European
Commission in the proposed "second stage" of the internal energy market
program. The most notable of these are the Commission's proposals for
unbundling and cost transparency.
The Commission defines "unbundling" as the separation of the man-
agement and accounting of production, transmission, and distribution
activities in the context of vertically-integrated companies." Unbundling is
defended by the Commission as essential to ensure transparency of opera-
tions, but is not intended to affect ownership structure.47
The unbundling of the ESB into separate business units for separate
businesses seems to fulfill some of the terms of the Commission's
unbundling rules as set forth in articles 23 and 24 of the proposed direc-
tive.4 However, neither the ESB nor the Irish government has announced
that the proposed EC rules on accounting will be followed strictly. The
ESB currently does not keep separate accounts for its business activity in
electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply, although it
does group its assets and allot asset lifespans in accordance with these cate-
gories and in line with international practice.49 Presumably, each of the
new divisions proposed by the government will maintain their own
accounts, and this accounting information will be published. The extent to
which Ireland intends to adhere to the Commission's other proposed
unbundling rules is unclear.
On the matter of transparency of operations, it should be noted that
the Irish restructuring calls for "cost transparency," another Commission
goal for electric utilities,50 but one that has not yet been translated into
binding legislation. The EC has adopted a directive on "price trans-
parency" which has been implemented by Ireland. However, cost trans-
parency and price transparency are two different matters. In fact, the
adoption of EC rules requiring cost transparency have been opposed and
are likely to face continued opposition by certain Member States.
46. See General Explanatory Memorandum, COM(91)548 final at 8. The specific proposal for
unbundling the electricity sector can be found in articles 23 and 24 of the proposed directive for
completion of the internal market in electricity. 1992 O.J. (C 65) 13.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 8. The proposed unbundling rules include the following: 1) vertically-integrated
electricity undertakings shall be divided into as many separate divisions as there are activities; 2) any
state aid granted to one division shall not benefit another division; 3) separate accounts for each
separate business to be established; 4) such accounts shall be audited and published; 5) such accounts
should also distinguish between distribution costs and supply costs and between electricity sales for
industrial purposes and for other purposes.
49. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 20, at 34.
50. As early as 1981, the Commission set forth the objective of transparency of "costs incurred in
the transformation of primary energy and its distribution to consumers," See G. Lang & G. Wunderlich,
After Price Transparency now Cost Transparency?, 12 ELEKTRzrrAT5WImTScHAFr 671 (1991) (quoting
COM(81)539).
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If Ireland does implement a complete system of cost transparency for
the ESB, it would seem that such a system would require disclosure of any
state aid, as well as of the cost structures at the stages of production, trans-
mission, and distribution. Such requirements might be more acceptable to
the ESB if it is allowed to remain the only market player and is guaranteed
a reasonable rate of return. If, however, competitors are permitted to
enter the market, the ESB would likely prefer more "opaqueness" and
resist public disclosure of some of its costs. Another traditional concern of
European governments regarding transparency regulation is maintaining
confidentiality with respect to energy purchases of end-users. The degree
to which Ireland wants to protect the confidentiality of Irish businesses in
this regard is also unclear.
The Irish restructuring proposals announced thus far have not
included the other two "agents for change" promoted by the Commission.
These are the abolition of exclusive rights and third-party access to the
transmission grid. Moreover, the Irish government has not taken any steps
to introduce a new licensing regime, which could open up the market to
competitors. 1
It should be emphasized that the European Commission is not seeking
the privatization or change of ownership of state-owned, vertically-inte-
grated monopolies such as the ESB. Such a transformation is not required
by the Treaty, nor is it contemplated in any proposed EC legislation. 2
II. REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION,
DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY
A. Regulation of Generation
There is little express Irish legislation relating to the generation of
electricity other than the provisions of the 1927 Act mentioned above, and
the licensing requirements for new generation facilities under the Planning
Acts 3 and environmental laws.54
Independent power production is practically nonexistent in Ireland.
The ESB generating stations have a total installed capacity of 3932 MW.
55
In contrast, the few private independent generators have a total capacity of
51. The present licensing scheme is of little significance. The permission of the ESB is required
before any person may generate, distribute or sell electricity to the general public or to particular
classes or members of the public. Section 37 of the 1927 Act provides the ESB with the power to issue
such permits, subject to some restrictions. Although a few permits have been granted by the ESB to
small private generators and suppliers, these operators account for less than one percent of the relevant
market. Electricity Act, No. 27, § 37 (1927).
52. See SELEcr COMM. ON TiH EUROPEAN CoMMuNIEs, Seventeenth Report, 1992-93, CMND
at 47. Testimony of Mr. Nicholas Argyris, European Commission's Directorate General for Energy:
"The Treaty does not allow the Community to become involved in issues of ownership systems within
the Member States, so privatization is certainly one area where our proposals have nothing to say....
We do not require a structural "unbundling" in the sense of a change of ownership." See also
RANCHER, supra note 4, at 82, 87-88.
53. Infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
54. Infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
55. 1991 ANN. REp., supra note 20, at 68.
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4-5 MW. The ESB takes power from these private schemes, but no legal
obligation to do so. 6
According to the 1993 restructuring announcements, there promises to
be an independent power procurement function within the ESB. Some
commentators have reported that the aim is "to ensure that the lowest cost
generators gain access to the system first and that an open access system
will be available to industrial units supplying the non-franchise market."57
Whether such regulation will be put in place remains to be seen. If
adopted, it could lead to an increase in the role of independent power pro-
ducers in Ireland.
As mentioned above, one of the concerns of the Irish government is
the regulation of the use of fuels in the electricity generation process. Pro-
duction is mainly based on fossil fuels, but there is a significant use of high-
priced peat.58 The peat usage is part of a strategy to provide employment
in certain rural areas. As part of the restructuring of the electricity sector,
the Irish government is considering an independent regulator that would
have some control of the fuel mix used in generation. Any such Tegulation
of this type is likely to be complex. Moreover, the enabling statute for any
such independent regulator would have to be squared with the ESB's statu-
tory role as advisor to the government on the use of resources for genera-
tion pursuant to section 27 of the 1927 Act.
B. Regulation of Transmission
The ESB has been granted a statutory monopoly over the high voltage
transmission network, and it owns all the high voltage lines in Ireland. The
ESB's market power is augmented by the fact that Ireland is the only
Member State in the European Community that lacks a cross-border inter-
connector with another Member State. An interconnector with Northern
56. In 1988, there were 28 such suppliers which were paid £519,781 by the ESB for a total quantity
of 17,765,654 Kwh. In addition, there are some cogeneration facilities owned by private industry for its
own use. For example, in August 1987, the Pfizer Chemical Corp in Cork commissioned a 5.4 MW gas
turbine generator. P.D. McGlade, Technical and Economic Aspects of CHP at Pfizer, COMBINED
PRODUCTION OF HEAT AND POWER (COGENERATION) 139 (J. Sirchis ed., 1990).
57. 150 POWER IN EUROPE 18 (June 4, 1993). Another commentator reported that: "The key
change in this restructuring is the advent of competition in generation. The power procurer, although
part of ESB, will operate independently, buying power from the most economical source. This source
could either be from [ESB's] generation business unit, or from independent power producers or from
the proposed UK interconnnector." Irish Energy Sector Opens Up, 55 EC ENERGY MowrHY 7 (July
1993).
58. The fuel usage for electricity generation in 1991 was a mixture o coal (4M.t), gas from the
offshore Kinsale gas pool (25%), oil (16%), peat (14%), and hydro and others (5%). See 1991 ANN.
REP., supra note 20, at 14. The oil price shock of 1973 led to a fuel diversification strategy in Ireland,
but one that eschewed the nuclear option. Ireland has no nuclear power station and no known supplies
of uranium. E. DONELAN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW IN IRELAND 117 n.96 (1985). A
1970s proposal to build a nuclear power station at Carnsore in County Wexford was shelved. See id at
118. In 1971, the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 12 (1971), was passed to provide for the establishment of a
nuclear energy board with specific functions. However, defimite decisions about the future of this board
have never been made. Because of the lack of nuclear stations in Ireland, there is no additional Irish
legislation of nuclear power. DONELAN, supra note 58, at 117-18.
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Ireland was destroyed by the IRA in 1975 and has not been rebuilt. While
there are plans to link Ireland's grid to the power pool in England and
Wales59 and to re-establish the Northern Ireland link,' the system remains
isolated at present. This isolation may partially explain the relatively static
nature of the structure and regulation of the Irish electricity supply indus-
try. Because there has been no threat of competition from foreign compa-
nies for nearly twenty years, there has been little need to regulate the
relationship between the ESB and other European electricity suppliers.
Pressure from the European Commission, as well as the need to accommo-
date potential investors, is now beginning to change this situation.
C. Rights to Transit and Third-Party Access
One of the subjects of EC electricity legislation is the transit of elec-
tricity across borders. Transit Directive 90/547 was adopted on October 29,
1990 and has been implemented into Irish law. The Transit Directive has
been promoted by the Commission as an important step towards the com-
pletion of the internal market.
According to the recitals, the general purpose of the Transit Directive
is to increase electricity transfers between grids and to reduce obstacles to
the exchange of electricity by "making the transit.., through grids compul-
sory."'" The high-voltage transmission lines and grid operators subject to
the directive are listed in annexes, including the ESB. Article 1 of the
directive asks the Member States to "take the measures necessary to facili-
tate transit" of electricity. The directive defines transit to cover transac-
tions in which: 1) the grid originates or has its final destination in the
Community, and 2) at least one internal border (i.e. an intra-Community
border between two Member States) is crossed.62 In short, the directive
establishes a limited legal obligation on grid operators to negotiate with
parties who seek certain types of contracts for transit.63
The implementation of the Transit Directive in Ireland has been
described as "academic" because there is presently no cross-border inter-
connector. Nevertheless, it can be viewed as having some significance since
the establishment of this legal duty on the ESB would be viewed as an
essential requirement by any potential investor in a cross-border intercon-
nector. The rights to transit help clear the way for such a development.
Another central point of the Commission's legislative program for the
European electricity industry is the introduction of a system of third-party
59. In 1991, the ESB and the National Grid Company in the United Kingdom completed a
feasibility study on a proposed ilterconnector. It was concluded that an interconnector would be
economically viable provided that the EC supports it with a sufficient subsidy. 1991 ANN. REP., supra
note 20, at 12.
60. Two standby 110kV links between the two halves of Ireland are scheduled for completion in
winter of 1994, and a larger sub-sea link has been suggested. See 154 POWER IN EUROPE 11-12 (July
1993).
61. Council Directive 90/547, Recital 9, 1990 O.J. (L 313) 13.
62. Id. art. 2(1)(b), (c).
63. See i. art. 3.
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access (TPA) to the network. According to this program, the electricity
transmission and distribution companies are required to offer terms for the
use of their grid to a small number of eligible consumers and distribution
companies in return for reasonable payment, provided that there is trans-
mission or distribution capacity available. 64 The proposal is controversial,
and it has been withdrawn at least temporarily due to opposition from a
variety of sources.
While a few Member States have third-party access of one sort or
another, Ireland is not one of them. There is no obligation of the ESB
under Irish legislation to offer access to any third-party to the transmission
or distribution system. Until the exclusive rights granted to the ESB are
eliminated, there is no reason to expect that there will be other utilities
seeking the use of the ESB grid for "wheeling" purposes.
D. Imports and Exports
There are no imports or exports of electricity to or from Ireland. The
ESB has been granted a statutory monopoly over imports and exports.65
For the purpose of the exercise of such powers, the 1945 Act also grants the
ESB, inter alia, the power "to do all such things as shall be incidental or
ancillary to the exercise of the said extended powers."'  It is arguable that
section 32 would not permit the delegation of the right to import or export
electricity to a third party. In a 1989 letter to the European Commission, a
representative of the Irish government stated that "[tihe authorization for
anybody else other than the ESB to import or export electricity would have
to be granted by further legislation. 67
Exclusive rights to import or export electricity have been targeted by
the European Commission for abolition. In August 1991, the Commission
sent a letter to Ireland, among other Member States, to open the infringe-
ment proceedings under the EEC Treaty. The Commission considers that
these exclusive rights are contrary to Articles 30, 34 and 37 of the EEC
Treaty.' The second step in the infringement proceedings was taken in
November 1992, when the Commission delivered a reasoned opinion under
Article 169 demanding action by Ireland (and four other Member States)
regarding exclusive rights to import and export electricity. Ireland was
given two months to show that measures were being undertaken to adapt
64. See Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in
Electricity, art. 14, 1992 OJ. (C 65) 10.
65. Electricity Act, No. 12, § 32 (1945).
66. Id
67. Letter from the Perrmanent Irish Representative to the European Community and to the
European Commission in response to the Commission's Questionnaire on monopolies and special or
exclusive rights in the field of electricity (May 10, 1989)(on file at the International Institute of Energy
Law, University of Leiden, The Netherlands).
68. Articles 30 and 34 of the EEC Treaty prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports or exports
and all measures having an equivalent effect between Member States. Article 37(1) provides that
"Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character so as to
ensure that . . . no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and
marketed exists between nationals of Member States." EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 30, 34, 37(1).
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these exclusive rights. Because of the change in government in November
1992, Ireland requested additional time to respond.69 As of June 1993, the
electricity division of the Ministry in charge of energy matters would not
comment on Ireland's position. In July 1993, the European Commission
announced that it would delay legal action before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities because two of the other Member States with
similar legislation, France and the Netherlands, indicated a willingness to
review their import and export rules. In light of the Commission's long
pursuit of this matter and of the present lack of a threat from cross-border
competition, it seems likely that section 32 of Ireland's 1927 Electricity Act
will be amended soon.
E. Taking of Private Property
The powers and duties of the ESB with respect to the placement and
maintenance of transmission lines has been a matter of controversy in
recent years. The applicable standards and procedures have evolved
through both judicial interpretation and legislative changes at the national
level and not because of any pressure from the European Community,
which tends to defer to the Member States on matters involving property
law.7 °
In the 1985 case, Electricity Supply Board v. Gormley,71 the Irish
Supreme Court held that section 53(5) of the 1927 Act (as amended by
section 46 of the 1945 Act) was unconstitutional because it did not provide
any statutory obligation to pay adequate compensation to landowners
when their property rights are affected by the placement of works on their
land by the ESB.72 However, the Court upheld the constitutionality of sec-
tion 98 of the 1927 Act (as amended in 1945), which gives the ESB the
compulsory power to lop or cut trees, shrubs, or hedges that obstruct or
interfere with any electric wires.7 3
Shortly after the Gormley decision, the Oireachtas amended section
53(5) of the 1927 Act. The ESB is now required to compensate landowners
when it acts under section 53. A method for resolving disputes over the
amount of such compensation is also provided for in the 1985 amendment.
F. Regulation of Distribution/Supply
Under current Irish law on electricity pricing, the ESB has a duty to
break even each year,74 and the tariffs charged to consumers of electricity
69. 50 EC ENERGY MONTHLY 11 (Feb. 1993).
70. Art. 222 of the EEC Treaty states: "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in the
Member States governing the system of property ownership." EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 222.
71. 129 I.R. 144 (1985).
72. md. at 151.
73. Id.
74. All charges made by the 1ESB "shall be fixed at such rates.., that the revenue derived in any
year... from such sales ... together with its revenue (if any) in such year from other sources will be
sufficient and only sufficient (as nearly may be) to pay all salaries, working expenses, and other
outgoings ... properly chargeable to income in that year (including [payments of interest and sinking
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are connected to this break-even obligation. As noted above, the 1993
restructuring is likely to involve the elimination of the ESB's break-even
obligation in order to allow the ESB to make a profit.
Nevertheless, the Irish government has retained the authority to
approve or reject the ESB's proposed tariffs. In recent years, the govern-
ment has imposed price freezes, which the ESB has had no choice but to
accept. For example, in 1988 a five percent value added tax (VAT) was
imposed on electricity prices. The ESB has also been instructed to charge
the same rates to rural and urban domestic consumers,75 although there is a
higher standing charge for rural areas. A unified tariff system applies to
the whole country, and there are only two tariff bands: domestic and non-
domestic. 76
EC legislation has only had a limited relevance to electricity pricing in
Ireland. In June 1990, the Price Transparency Directive77 was adopted by
the Council of the European Communities for the purpose of "improv[ing]
the transparency of electricity and gas prices charged to industrial end-
users". This Directive was due to come into force on July 1, 1991, and its
implementation in Ireland has been uncontroversial. As its legal basis, the
Directive takes Article 213 EEC, which enables the Commission to collect
information required for the performance of its tasks.
The Directive basically obligates the institution to make a reporting of
a limited nature with respect to undertakings that supply electricity or gas
to industrial end-users. Article 1 of the Directive requires the Member
States to take the necessary steps to ensure that such undertakings commu-
nicate certain information to the Statistical Office of the European Com-
munity (SOEC) on a periodic basis. The information reported under this
Directive relates to electricity and gas prices for industrial end-users, the
pricing systems in use, and a breakdown of consumers with the correspond-
ing volume of consumption.78 The form, contcnt, and other features of the
information reported under the Directive are set out in annexes.79 Under
Article 5, when "statistically significant anomalies or inconsistencies in the
data" are noted by the SOEC, it is permitted to check on the reliability of
the data via inspections.
Several observations can be made about the Price Transparency Direc-
tive. The first is that the function of the Directive is primarily to communi-
cate information to the Commission rather than to the consumer. In
testimony before a committee of the British House of Lords in late 1992, a
Commission representative seemed to describe the system effected by the
Directive as follows: "a system of information to the Commission which,
fund payments]) and such sums as the [ESBI may think proper to set aside in that year for reserve fund,
extensions, renewals, depreciation, loans, and other like purposes." Electricity Act, No. 27, § 21(2)
(1927).
75. MORGAN & HOGAN, supra note 21, at 122.
76. See Electricity Tariff Report 6: Ireland, 13 PowER iN EUROPE 7-10 (Feb. 13, 1992).
77. Council Directive 90/377, 1990 OJ. (L 185) 16.
78. Id. art. 1.
79. See HANCHER, supra note 4, at 176 (a summary of the form and content of the required
information).
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on the basis of that information, publishes, as it were, market prices for
certain categories of consumers". s
A second observation is that the Directive is directed only at the
downstream market. The "transparency" that is being sought under the
terms of the Directive relates only to the price charged by electricity and
gas suppliers to end-users. It does not apply directly to cost structures at
the stages of production, transmission, and distribution, which precede the
stage of direct energy supply.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATION
The Irish electricity legislation adopted in 1927 and 1945 does not con-
tain many provisions that reflect environmental concerns. For example, the
statutory standards for the planning, ministerial approval, and execution of
the damming of rivers8' do not contain any duty to minimize adverse envi-
ronmental impact, except for the purpose of protecting fisheries.82 The
ESB is liable to pay compensation to any person who suffers loss by reason
of an injury to a fishery or fishing right where such injury is caused by the
construction or operation of hydroelectric works.83 The 1945 Act prohibits
the discharge of chemicals or other substances designed to injure a generat-
ing station into any river or watercourse connected with the production of
hydroelectric power.84 Such provisions were included primarily to protect
the fisheries industry and the ESB operations themselves, rather than to
protect the environment per se. The ESB exercises its duties under these
Acts in a manner that entails considerable expenditures and raises the level
of environmental protection in Ireland.8 5
The Irish planning system was altered significantly with respect to
electricity and gas installations as a result of the implementation of the
1985 Council Directive regarding environmental impact assessments
(EIAs). s6 The Irish EIA regulations came into force on February 1, 1990.87
These regulations amend the Irish Planning Act and regulations promul-
gated thereunders in a number of consequential ways. EIA statements
80. See SELECr Comm. ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 52, at 47 (testimony of Mr.
Nicholas Argyris).
81. Electricity Act, No. 12, §§ 4, 6 (1945).
82. Id §§ 4(2), 11.
83. Id § 28.
84. Id § 42.
85. See Y. SCANNELL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUrrON CONTROL IN IRELAND
22 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the ESB's activities).
86. Council Directive 85/337, OJ. (L 175) 40 concerns the assessment of the effects of certain
public and private projects on the environment. For a discussion of this directive and the provisions
relating to the electricity industry, see HANCHER, supra note 4, at 227-29.
87. European Communities (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 1989 S.I. 25 (1990)
(hereinafter EIA Regulations).
88. The Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, No. 28 (1963) gives planning
authorities (which are for the most part co-extensive with local authorities) the power to grant or deny
planning permissions for any "development" as defined in the Planning Act. "Development" is divided
into two broad categories: 1) the carrying out of any works on, in or under land, or 2) the making of any
material change in the use of any structures or any other land. "Exempted development" is
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must now be submitted for all specified developments made public and
regarded by the planning authorities along with any supplemental informa-
tion related thereto. In accordance with the EC Directive, the Irish EIA
regulations have two classes of developments that constitute "specified
developments" requiring an EIA statement. Part I of the First Schedule
includes thermal power stations or other combustion installations with a
heat output of 300 MW or more. 9 Part II of said Schedules include the
following developments:
(a) industrial installations for the production of electricity [unless included in
Part I] with a heat output of 300 MW or more,
(b) industrial installations for carrying gas, steam and hot water with a poten-
tial heat output of 300MW or more; transmission of electrical energy by over-
head cables where the voltage would be 200 kV or more,
(c) installations for hydroelectric production with an output of 20 MW or
more, or where the surface area of water impounded would be 30 hectares or
more, or where there would be a 30 percent change in the maximum, mini-
mum, or mean flows in the main river channel.90
The last requirement (item c) is a variation on the EIA Directive. The
implementation of the EIA Directive in Ireland effectively "de-exempted"
the electricity and gas industry from its privileged status under the previous
planning regime.
A substantial amount of additional Irish law and regulation has been
adopted recently to protect the environment. 91 The impetus for these new
laws and regulations has been a combination of changes not only in inter-
nal Irish policy,' but also in European Community law.
The Air Pollution Act of 1987 is designed to limit and reduce emis-
sions. This legislation empowers the Minister for the Environment to
determine and impose emission limits for pollutants from premises.93 Pol-.
luting activities require licenses granted by local authorities. The Minister
for the Environment has adopted regulations pursuant to this legislation
which specify air quality standards for S02, NOX, particulates and lead.
development that may be carried out without planning permission. Under the original Planning Act
regime, a large number of developments by the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) and the state gas
company, Bord Gais Eireann, fell within the "exempted development" category. These exemptions are
provided for in section 4(1)(f) of the Planning Act and in the third schedule (classes 22-25) to the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Regulations 1977.
89. EIA Regulations, 1989 S.I., First Schedule, pt. I, § 2 (1990).
90. Id. pt. II, § 3(a)(b)j).
91. See generally MATHESON ORMSBY PRENTICE, SoLICrroRs & Tim INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AuTrorr OF IRELAND, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN IRELAND (1992).
92. See, e.g., Environment Council, A POLICY FOR Tih ENVIRONMENT: REPORT (Stationery
Office 1980); E. Henry, Energy Conservation in Ireland, 1975-1985: Report to the Minister for
Transport and Power (Stationery Office 1976). The opinions of certain legal commentators should also
be given some credit. See, e.g., Y. Scannell, Aspects of Pollution Control in Ireland, 2 DUBLIN U. L. J.
18-20 (1976) (criticizing a "fragmented" and "unsound" system of pollution control in Ireland); see also
SCANNELL, supra note 85.
93. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE ROLE OF IEA GOVERNMENTS IN ENERGY 163 (1992).
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The minimum emissions standards have been set by Community
legislation.94
The Environmental Protection Agency Act of 199291 established the
Environmental Protection Agency (An Ghndmhaireacht urn Chaomhunt!
Comhshaoil), which has the task of carrying out integrated pollution con-
trol in Ireland. New licensing requirements have been or will be issued
under Part IV of this Act, which expressly applies to the production of
energy in plants with an output of 50MW or greater.
96
The ESB has reacted to these changes in environmental law and pol-
icy. In 1990, it created a senior management position and appointed an
officer to monitor the environmental impact of ESB's operations. 7 In
addition, the ESB is promoting energy conservation. The ESB is seeking
to maintain annual demand growth at three percent. The ESB is advocat-
ing the use of energy efficient light bulbs and equipment, and better insula-
tion and metering in order to encourage energy efficiency.
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY REGULATION
Ireland has adopted the Liability for Defective Products Act, 1991,98
which is designed to implement the EC Directive on products liability.99
The Irish products liability law creates potential liability for the ESB for
damages caused by "defective" electricity.
The scope of such liability is unclear not only because national laws
have not yet been applied to electricity utilities in any of the Member
States, but also because Ireland has attempted to narrow the potential
impact of the EC Directive. Article 2 of the EC Directive states flatly:
"'Product' includes electricity." In contrast, Article 1 of the Irish products
liability law defines "product" as including "electricity where damage is
caused as a result of a failure in the process of generation of electricity."
By implication, the Irish law attempts to exclude damages that are not
caused by the generation process. This would seem to exclude the applica-
tion of the Irish product liability law to damages caused by the transmis-
sion, distribution, or supply of electricity. Under the present formulation of
the Irish law, claims against the ESB for such damages would apparently be
covered by existing Irish tort and contract law. 1°° It is arguable that the
94. The ESB claimed recently that it is meeting its commitments under the EC's Directive on
large combustion plants. Council Directive 88/609, 1988 O.J. (L 336) 1. See 55 EC ENERGY MONTHLY 8
(July 1993).
95. Environmental Agency Protection Act, No. 7 (1992).
96. Id. First Schedule, pt. IV, § 2.
97. 1990 ANN. REP., supra note 27, at 6.
98. Liability for Defective Products Act, No. 28 (1991). For a general discussion of the Irish
products liability act, see T. Bird, Liability for Defective Products Ac4 1991, 10 IRSH LAw TIMES 188-91
(No. 8) (Aug. 1992).
99. Council Directive 85/374 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
100. See B. MCMAHON & W. BtNcwr, IRIsH LAW OF TORTS 186-87 (2d ed. 1990) ("The Directive
supplements, rather than replaces, the existing remedies in tort and contract").
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Irish version is an improper implementation of the EC Directive and could
be challenged on pre-emption grounds.10 1
The Irish products liability law raises the issue of whether the EC
Directive is intended to extend the strict liability standard to electricity at
all levels of the electricity supply industry or only at some levels. Does the
directive create potential liability for defects in generation, transmission,
distribution, and/or supply of electricity, or does it only apply to a specific
stage of the process? In the U.S., courts have split over the issue of
whether electricity flowing through high-voltage transmission lines is a ser-
vice or a product.1°2 Some courts have ruled that electricity is not a prod-
uct until it is transformed into low-voltage electricity for end-user
consumption. Other courts have held that electricity in high voltage lines is
a product, thereby allowing recovery to persons who are injured by contact
with such lines.
The Irish government seems to have taken the opposite approach from
that used by many United States courts: Ireland has apparently tried to
limit the strict liability rule in electricity cases by placing potential liabilities
upstream at the generation end, rather than downstream at the supply end.
The likely explanation for the Irish approach is that the concept of a
"defect" in generation is difficult to comprehend and, therefore, to estab-
lish. If the Irish law is maintained and succeeds in thwarting products liabil-
ity claims for damages caused by electricity, it will do little to raise the
standard of protection for electricity consumers in Ireland.
VI. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATION' 03
The European Community has pursued an extensive legislative pro-
gram in the field of public procurement, some of which is specifically
101. The Irish definition of "product" in the case of electricity is arguably pre-empted because of its
conflict with Community law. A judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Communities that
could be used in support of this argument is Case 158/88, Commission v. Ireland, E.C.R. 1-2367, 3
C.M.L.R. 103 (1990). In this case, which involved a series of EC directives on uniform exemptions for
international travellers from turnover taxes and excise duties, Ireland attempted to "clarify" the
directives by adding a minimum 48-hour requirement not provided for in the directives. The Court of
Justice ignored Ireland's economic justifications and instead concluded that the 48-hour requirement
was "incompatible" with the directives because no such derogation was expressly provided for in the
directives and because it would have limited the exemption rights of those travellers who stayed less
than 48 hours.
Ireland's implementation of the EC Directive on products liability seems to fall within the purview
of the Commission v. Ireland case. The EC Directive on products liability contains provisions that allow
Member States to derogate from Community requirements on narrow, specific issues that are subject to
explicit reporting obligations to the European Commission. The designation of electricity as a
"product" is not one of the issues on which Member States are explicitly permitted to derogate.
Therefore, it is arguable that the facial incompatibility requires that the Irish definition be considered
pre-empted by the EC Directive regardless of any economic justifications that might be offered in
support of the Irish version.
102. See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Comment, Electrifying Solutions for the Shocking and
Disparate Treatment of Electricity Within Product Liability Law, 93 DiCK. L. REv. 851 (1989).
103. For a detailed treatment of procurement and the electricity sector, see HANCHER, supra note 4,
at 235-63.
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directed at the utilities sector."°4 Because Ireland has implemented only a
portion of these procurement directives,' 05 the following describes only the
Community legislation.
Prior to January 1, 1993, the utilities sector, which includes water,
energy, transport and telecommunication sectors, had been excluded from
the application of the EC's public procurement regime relating to public
works and public supplies. In 1990, the council adopted Directive 90/
531,06 commonly known as the "Utilities Directive," which set forth pro-
curement rules for contracting entities that provide or operate "fixed net-
works intended to provide a service to the public in connection with the
production, transport or distribution" of electricity, gas, heat, or drinking
water.1°7 Directive 90/531 is backed up with Community legislation on
remedies.' °
On June 14, 1993, the Community adopted three new directives on
procurement matters. °9 TWo of the directives amend and consolidate the
procurement regime for public works11 ° and public supplies."'
The adoption of the Utilities Directive has been described as "an
important victory for the Community Institutions in their attempt to
expose public firms to greater competition," '12 and it should be "seen in
the context of the EC Commission's ongoing efforts to liberalize more gen-
erally sectors such [as] telecommunications, electricity and gas." ' In con-
trast to the other procurement directives, the distinction between public
and private undertakings is not crucial in relation to utilities. 1 4 Even pri-
vately-owned utilities are covered by the Utilities Directive as long as they
"operate on the basis of exclusive or special rights"'1 5 granted by a Mem-
ber State.
There are some significant exclusions. While the Directive covers
equipment and materials, it does not extend to fuel purchasing. Article 9
104. For a detailed treatment of the public procurement regime generally, including the 1993
directives, see P. Tanpm, PuBuc fPocuvRimar nN ma EC (1993). For a description and analysis of
the public procurement rules for utilities, see A. Brown, The Extension of the Public Procurement Rules
for Utilities, 30 C.M.L. REv. 721-48 (1993).
105. See European Communities Regulations, S.I. Nos. 36, 37, 38 (1992).
106. See 1990 OJ. (L 297) 1 on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and telecommunication sectors.
107. 1&. art. 2(2)(a).
108. Council Directive 92/13, 1992 OJ. (L 76) 14, co-ordinating the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunication sectors.
109. The new Utilities Directive is 93/38, 1993 OJ. (L 199) 84.
110. Council Directive 93/37, 1993 OJ. (L 199) 54, consolidating Directive 71/305, 1971 OJ. (L 185)
1, as amended by Directive 09/380, 1990 OJ. (L 210) 1 and Decision 90/380, 1990 OJ. (L 187) 55.
111. Council Directive 93/36, 1993 OJ. (L 199) 1, consolidating and amending Directive 77/62, 1997
OJ. (L 13) 1, as amended by Directive 80/767, 1980 OJ. (L 215) 1 and Directive 88/295, 1988 OJ. (L
297) 1.
112. J. MCELDoWNEY, ELEcrmcrry LAW HANDBOOK: LAW AND PRACrnCE 66 (1992)(chapter
authored by L. HANCHER).
113. BROWN, supra note 104, at 722.
114. BROWN, supra note 104, at 723.
115. Council Directive 93/38, art. 2(1)(b), 1993 OJ. (L 199) 84.
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provides that the Directive shall not apply to contracts awarded by the enti-
ties listed in Annexes II and III which list the electricity and gas utilities
subject to the Directive. This major exclusion has been linked to the Euro-
pean Commission's progress towards achieving the internal energy market.
As one commentator has explained, "until various matters concerning the
internal energy market have been resolved satisfactorily, the application of
procurement procedures to purchases of electricity and other forms of
energy would be a wholly inappropriate and ineffectual way of liberalizing
the Community energy market."' 16 This exclusion will be re-examined by
the Council on the basis of a Commission report to be made not later than
four years after the Directive's application. 1 7 The exclusion of fuel
purchasing is of particular significance for electricity generating companies
which operate thermal combustion plants. Other significant exclusions for
the electricity and gas industries are those that relate to contracts with affil-
iated undertakings, contracts under certain value thresholds, and secret
contracts involving security interests."18 These exclusions are designed to
introduce greater flexibility into the procurement rules as compared to the
rules applicable to non-utilities.
A controversial provision in the Utilities Directive is Article 36 (or
Article 29 in the unamended Directive 90/531), which is the so-called Com-
munity preference rule. This rule allows Member States to give preference
to bids with a 50 percent Community content and when two or more bids
are considered equivalent, requires Community undertakings to be given
preference within a three percent price range. This preferential treatment
has been criticized by the U.S. government, among others, for failing to
provide predictable treatment to suppliers of non-EC products. 119 Of par-
ticular concern is the market for power generation and telecommunications
equipment.
In an effort to resolve the dispute over the Community preference
rule, the United States and the EC concluded a Memorandum of Under-
standing on government procurement in May 1993.120 The Memorandum
is essentially an interim agreement with a limited life span of about two
years. The Memorandum is the result of bilateral negotiations that were
undertaken in the interest of facilitating an agreement on a new GATT
Code on Government Procurement, which has been the subject of multilat-
eral negotiations since 1984. The Memorandum shall terminate automati-
cally on the earlier of May 30, 1995 or the entry into force of any expanded
Code on Government Procurement. Either party can also terminate the
Memorandum on May 30, 1994 upon 30 days prior notice. The reciprocal
116. TREPrE, supra note 104, at 15-16.
117. See Council Directive 93/38, arts. 9, 44, 1993 O.J. (L 199) 84.
118. ld. arts. 10, 13, 14.
119. See U.S. GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE ON Ta EC INTERNAL MARKET, EC 1992: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S SINGLE MARKET
PRORAM 19 (1990).
120. Commission Notice 93/C178/16, 1993 OJ. (C 178) 19. The Council approved the
Memorandum in a decision of May 10, 1993. Council Decision 93/323, 1993 OJ. (L 125) 1 (containing
text of the Memorandum with annexes).
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commitments made under the Memorandum are described as a "downpay-
ment" towards an expanded GATT Code on Government Procurement.121
Under the Memorandum, public authorities in the EC that are subject
to the GATT Code on Government Procurement are required to extend to
United States bidders the same advantages, products and services as are
afforded to Community bidders for public works contracts under the Direc-
tive on public works and the Directive on public service contracts. Specific
provisions of the Memorandum apply to EC and United States electricity
utilities. 22 On the Community side, the EC has agreed to extend the bene-
fits of the Utilities Directive to United States products, suppliers and con-
tractors in the award of contracts by EC entities in the electricity sector and
to make the benefits of the related Community rules on remedies available
to United States suppliers and contractors for such awards. On the United
States side, the federal government has agreed to waive the Buy America
Act"2 to the award of contracts by federal entities' 24 in the electric power
sector above a threshold of $6.5 million for works contracts and $450,000
for goods contracts. The United States also agreed to abide by the sub-
stance of the Federal Acquisition Regulations with respect to Community
bidders. The Memorandum applies to tenders issued during its period of
validity.
At the time of the conclusion of the Memorandum, the number of EC
entities covered by the Memorandum exceeded the number of United
States entities. The EC entities are listed in an annex and include most of
the major electricity suppliers in the EC Member States, both public and
private. The United States federal government was able to make commit-
ments with respect to federal agencies, but not with respect to "sub-fed-
eral" entities. Public procurement at the level of state or local government
is not preempted by federal law, and therefore, any commitments on state
or local procurement has to come from those sub-federal governmental
authorities. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Memorandum, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative has sought the voluntary commitment
of sub-federal entities to be included in the final entry lists. In a letter
accompanying the Memorandum,' 25 the United States Trade Representa-
tive promised to attempt to obtain final commitments from all 50 states,
municipalities with a population over 500,000 and entities operating in or
serving such municipalities. The aim is to complete this process in time for
the final phase of negotiations scheduled to begin in January 1994. More-
over, the United States Trade Representative stated that "[a]ny commit-
ments by sub-federal entities will be bound in legislation implementing a
final procurement agreement."'12 6
121. Id. sixth recital.
122. I& art. 3.
123. 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1993).
124. The United States federal entities in the electric power sector are the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the Power Marketing Administrations of the Department of Energy.
125. 1993 O.J. (L 125) 53.
126. Id
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With respect to the Irish electricity sector, the EC procurement regime
has not yet had any significant impact on competition. The Utilities Direc-
tive contains significant exclusions that preserve much of the status quo.
Some of these exclusions can be narrowed by the Council following a Com-
mission review in not less than four years. Under the terms of the 1993
Memorandum between the U.S. and the EC, American companies are enti-
tled to receive the benefits and protection of the Utilities Directive and
other EC procurement legislation in bidding for the relevant contracts in
the Irish electricity sector, and the EC firms such as the ESB are afforded
similar treatment in the U.S.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The implementation of Community legislation in Ireland has begun to
change the rather static and insulated legal regime applicable to the ESB.
This change is most evident in the new standards and liabilities that have
been adopted in Ireland recently to protect the environment and the con-
sumer and to promote openness in procurement activities. In particular,
the implementation of the EC Directive on environmental impact assess-
ment compelled significant changes to the Irish planning laws which had
previously exempted much of the ESB's developmental projects. Emis-
sions standards have also been established in compliance with Community
directives. With respect to products liability in the electricity sector, the
Irish government has attempted to narrow the impact of the EC products
liability directive, but this effort is legally suspect.
The EC Directives on price transparency and transit have been imple-
mented in Ireland, but neither has had much significance. Because there
are no cross-border interconnections, the right to transit is presently of lit-
tle concern to the ES13. Similarly, the European Commission's campaign
to abolish the ESB's exclusive rights to import and export, while likely to
succeed, is unlikely to have any impact in Ireland as long as there are no
interconnections. Nevertheless, these legal changes are important for
clearing the path for potential investment in interconnections.
This article reveals that the European Commission is concerned not
only with removal of barriers to electricity trade, such as the exclusive stat-
utory rights to import and export, but also with matters that are more
"internal" to a Member State, such as the structural organization and gen-
eral accounting methods of state-owned utilities. While the Commission's
program for the completion of the internal energy market has been stalled,
many of its proposed methods for promoting greater integration and com-
petition within the European electricity sector are compelling. They influ-
ence national decisions on regulation and structure of the electricity
industry. The Irish case is an example of the force of the ideas behind the
Commission's program. In line with the Commission's "unbundling" pro-
posals, the ESB is facing its first major change to its structure since it was
established in 1927. Other Irish measures, albeit modest ones, to promote
greater transparency and competition are also being introduced or
considered.
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The present changes in structure and regulation of the Irish electricity
system are modest when compared to the dramatic changes in countries
like the United Kingdom. Given the Irish political climate, the tradition of
statism, and the relatively small size of the market, there is no reason to
expect the government to embrace competition-oriented measures such as
the break-up and privatization of the ESB, third-party access to the grid, or
an open licensing system for private power producers. However, the pres-
ent restructuring helps to prepare Ireland for participation in the EC's
internal market in electricity and to open the door for the continued regu-
latory reform in the future.

